Scipio Africanus: Rome's Greatest General

I so enjoyed this book. As a former Israeli Army infantry solider, I think twice before reading books of a military nature, having been convinced through my own experience that nothing other than the battle field itself...particularly its topography and other features unique to it...can explain the way a battle unfolds. The problem with too many military histories is the failure of a book format in recreating the battle field...even with the help of diagrams. Because of his skillful use of prose, Gabriel overcomes this common difficulty. He deftly brings the attending circumstances of each battle into focus, with the help of simple, yet helpful diagrams, in addition to his highly readable prose. Although the story of the Rome and her wars has been told so many times, there were so many little gems that I encountered for the first time. For example, although I thought I was familiar with the consular system of two governing consuls, I did not know that in battle, they alternated command between them every other day. That is just one of several fresh insights I got in the chapter on the nature of each side's armies. The closing section of that same chapter on the daily logistical requirements of the army and its pack/draft animals was also enlightening, and helped me understand more than ever why ancient armies required winter quarters, until the fields produced this much needed fodder again in the spring. Additional pluses to this volume are Gabriel's judgement with regard to primary sources, neither entirely trusting them, nor entirely dismissing them, but falling somewhere in the sober middle ground. When a source's report seems doubtful, he offers several likely alternative scenarios, all of which are reasonably and convincingly argued. In addition to presenting the battles themselves, Gabriel does a great job presenting the political considerations of both Rome and Carthage throughout the war, as well as the internal intrigues, particularly between competing factions within the Roman aristocratic led senate. Although the author obviously admires Scipio, he presents a balanced image of him, including his strategic errors, such as his wasted siege of Utica on the African campaign, and his brutal putting down of Spanish insurgents. Consequently, his portrait of Scipio seems judicious. If at times it sounds amazing, it is not because of the author's own embellishments, but because the man, Scipio, seems to have been truly one of those rare individuals to attain to complete leadership skill set that is usually not found in one person. Within this context, Gabriel stresses that all the great generals of history were men who had undergone the best intellectual training/education that their times and cultures could provide them. That ultimately, only a fine-tuned intellect, distinguished by linear thinking---the ability to imagine the likely cause and effect of every possible scenario---in addition to daring, and the willingness to gamble, is what coverages in all great field commanders. I can't believe someone gave this book only one star! This book was such a pleasure to read, that I will likely read it again sometime in the future!

When historians and soldiers talk about the punic war,they mention a number of points.That it was key in Rome's rise as an empire,that the leading star was Hannibal,that key military concepts such as the Fabian strategy,the double envelopment,the battle of annhilation,of fighting on after losing the first couple of battles originated with this war.We often hear stories of how Hannibal crossed the Alps with his elephants or how he destroyed 3 different roman armies in 3 different battles (the last one ,Cannae is held as a tactical masterpiece).We hear how Fabius used a pseudo-guerilla strategy of avoiding battles with Hannibal and eroding his army through skirmishes or how the Battle of Metaurus is one of the decisive battles of world history where one Roman general after receiving intelligence of Hasdrubal (hannibal's brother ) arrival ,made a forced march to join up with another Roman general to launch a surprise attack on Hasdrubal ,destroying his army and killing him in the process and saving Rome.What we very rarely hear about the Punic war is the story of the most brilliant general to have fought in that war,Scipio Africanus. In this masterpiece of a book,Richard Gabriel relates the story of this most brilliant of generals and makes a convincing argument that not only was he a great general but also a master grand strategist and one who had formidable political skills.Scipio ,haing survived a number of early battles went on to revolutionize the Roman army in terms of boldness,tactics,organization,weapons and the use of intelligence.He modified and expanded the legion to make it better to resist attacks by "barbarian infantry",he introduced the gladius captured from the spanish tribes as the main weapon for the legion,his manuvers such as the capture of New CArthage,the attack on Hasdrubal at Baecula or the attack on the Carthaginian camps at Utica were exceptional for their boldness and daring.His use of deception,innovation and the reverse cannae formation at Illipia to destroy a larger army were quite simply a tactical masterpiece that deserve to be mentioned along with the battles of gaugamela,cannae and austerlitz.He was also a master in understanding the field of logistics.Even more outstanding were his abilities to read and manipulate the political situation.The senate in Rome had much of a say in running the war and it could and did disrupt successfull strategies if they were unpopular.A case in point is the Fabian strategy which though effective was temporarily disrupted because of its unpopularity.Scipio was able to successfully prosecute his invasion of North Africa inspite of these difficulties .A modern analogy would have been if General Westmoreland was able to convince the american public to stay the course in Vietnam or if the Soviet General staff was able to convince the Politburo to stay the course in afghanistan(both these wars were political and not military defeats). In making his case ,Gabriel convincingly illustrates that not only was Scipio the best general in the Punic war but also the greatest general that imperial rome ever produced, greater than Julius Caesar who often gets far more credit.Indeed,this book should serve as the template of generalship.

Richard Gabriel is a distinguished military historian who writes well and in this book provides a wealth of information and speculation concerning Scipio. Most noteworthy are the logistical analyses, which in general are well researched and highly informative. There are some problems with this book, though, despite its overall high quality. The author tells us that a lot of the best research on the Second Punic War is in German, which fortunately he is able to read. Wunderbar, I told myself. But examining the bibliography at the end of the book I was surprised to discover several German titles rendered ungrammatically, a children's book by Donauer included as if it were a scholarly work, and the works of the top scholars of the Punic Wars publishing in German over the past few decades (Jakob Seibert, Pedro Barcelo, Karl Christ usw.) blatantly missing. Gabriel's attempts to present Scipio as a "brilliant" operational commander and "brilliant" strategist greater than Hannibal fail to convince (as do equally misguided attempts by others to portray Wellington as greater than Napoleon--Napoleon, by the way, regarded Hannibal as the greatest general of all, see the Memorial de Sainte-Helene by the Comte Emmanuel de las Cases). As the author suggests, the brilliance of a general depends on the quality of his defeated opponents, but the only great opponent Scipio ever defeated was Hannibal at Zama, a victory scored by luck and the fortunate arrival of Massinissa's cavalry at the battlefield in the nick of time (even Gabriel concedes that Hannibal had the better battle plan). To boost Scipio's credentials Gabriel claims repeatedly that the incompetent Carthaginian generals Scipio defeated in Spain were actually competent, especially the bungling Hasdrubal Gisco, surely the sorriest excuse for a commander in the Punic Wars. He credits Scipio with great military innovations, but fails to mention that he copied these from the organization of Hannibal's army, which Scipio experienced at the Roman defeats at the Ticinus, Trebbia, and Cannae. Scipio's victory at Ilipa owes more to Hannibal as a model that to any ingenuity on Scipio's part. The author even tries to credit Scipio with deriving the gladius hispaniensis from the Spanish falcata, although anyone who has held a falcata and a gladius in hand can tell they are totally different weapons. The gladius was based on a Spanish sword, but it is unlikely it was the falcata. Scipio is presented as an honorable man, and unfortunately Gabriel whitewashes his atrocities in ordering the butchery of the civilians in three cities (excusing the terrorism because "it served his strategic ends"), not to mention the scourging and beheading of his own officers after they rebelled because of lack of pay, even though he had promised them clemency if they surrendered. (Hannibal, by the way, although he fought in enemy territory for 15 years without ever being defeated, during which time he often could not pay his mercenaries, never suffered mutiny, which perhaps shows which commander was better able to inspire loyalty in his forces). Gabriel attributes Scipio's refusal to engage Hannibal in Italy to some grand strategic plan concerning Rome's future security, which supposedly demanded he be defeated in Africa, when there is a much simpler explanation, namely that Scipio was afraid he would be defeated if he faced Hannibal in Italy and needed to get him to return to Africa minus his cavalry in order to have a chance of victory. Scipio was clearly an opportunist concerned with his personal glory and refused peace overtures (even betraying the Carthaginians when he pretended to consider their very reasonable proposals, and then burning their camps in a treacherous night attack). He was willing to sacrifice countless lives (of his own soldiers and those of the enemy) in order to win a triumph for narcissistic glory. Hannibal was definitely the greater commander and the better man, a patriot who sacrificed everything for his country. The notion of his being motivated by hatred of Rome is a myth created by Roman propaganda, bent upon demonizing Hannibal and the Carthaginians. This is evident in the writings of Livy and particularly Silius Italicus, a poet and not a historian, whose versified fictions Gabriel accepts as reliable historical sources. Even among Roman generals, Marius, Sulla, Pompey, and above all Ceasar far outshine Scipio. Gabriel's claim that Caesar displayed no originality or innovation in the battlefield is belied by that brilliant defense in the siege of Alesia, to mention just one example. Gabriel's book, although in many ways a significant contribution to the field, suffers of bias in his efforts to achieve "majorem Scipionic gloriam." And as to the claim that Rome's victory over Carthage was good for posterity, the reader is urged to peruse Neil Faulkner's excellent book "Rome: Empire of the Eagles" to evaluate the destructive and predatory imperialism of Rome which can be contrasted with the tolerance of Carthaginian culture, destroyed in a frenzy of genocide and ethnic cleansing by the Romans in 146 BCE.

Cannot say enough great things about this book. The research put into this book is fantastic and it seems to be historically accurate. Well written and exciting.

Have thoroughly enjoyed reading this extremely readable, page-turned of a tome on Scipio Africanus. So often in Roman and Ancient History so-called minor figures, who had a tremendous influence on events and the course of history. The author, who obviously has great respect for his subject, does an excellent job in weaving the military, tactical, and strategic elements of Scipio's generalship and does so in an "everyman" manner, where the novice to the subject, as well as the scholar on Roman history, would enjoy his work. Would have liked more background on the politics of Roman and Carthage at the time of the Second Punic War and ultimately what brought Scipio down, but that might have made the book more dense and convoluted and taken away from a greater appreciation of a man who was more than Hannibal's equal, but most likely rivaled Caesar's generalship as well. 4.75 Stars!

SCIPIO AFRICANUS is an excellent introduction to the amazing general Scipio Africanus. The book is straight forward, and as simple as a work of history can be and still encompass all the information one needs to understand the subject. I recommend it highly for those like myself who know little or nothing about Scipio Africanus and would like to learn more about the man who, in the opinion of some, was greater than Julius Caesar.

An excellent and thorough description and analysis of the generalship of Scipio Africanus. The author provides a strategic analysis of Scipio's campaigns along with with operational, logistical, and other details that only a historian who was also an experienced military officer would provide.

To dispense with the hype about "Rome's Greatest General", I believe that comparisons against various opponents or other commanders at various times in history are essentially meaningless and not worth discussing. Each generally successful commander is worth some analysis and thought, and among the Romans, Scipio Africanus is worth more than most. After all, who has the time and interest to study Lucullus or Marcellus? But beyond that, who cares? Scipio never had Napoleon's problems or was forced to fight battles that extended beyond his personal sight, and arms, training, tactics and logistics vary greatly with the passage of years. Caesar, for example, seemed to face new and unknown conditions in Gaul every time he turned around. At least Scipio knew more of less what his enemy would look like and how he would be armed and would fight. The author has introduced many good points of analysis, and his maps and descriptions of Scipio's battles are far better than most. No doubt this is due to his ownership of two references I haven't seen (but would like to), namely "Antike Schlachtfelder" (Ancient Battlefields)and "Schlachten Atlas zur antiken Kriegsgeschichte" (Atlas of Battles for the Histories of Ancient Wars.) Perhaps the author can tell me where to purchase these references. It is clear that Scipio was at least mildly innovative in making the legion structure more maneuverable, but he was blessed as all Roman commanders were with dedicated troops even if they were the militia of the time. The purely professional Roman soldier was yet to come and would make his appearance in the Social Wars. Nevertheless, the Roman citizen-soldier was well trained and disciplined, and all commanders could count on a certain level of martial skill and steadfastness in whatever legions he fielded. By way of contrast, American commanders have historically suffered by having to rely on very uneven troops in all American wars from the Revolution to Korea. A commander must know his men and how to use them, and that was the outstanding trait exhibited by Daniel Morgan at Cowpens. Scipio also showed this trait, as did Hannibal to a similar degree. With respect to Zama, I have always thought it was a close-run thing in which luck played a part in addition to Hannibal having to use too many untrained troops and certainly untrained elephants. Author Gabriel does tend to cast the ancient battles under a modern microscope and impute modern motives and attitudes to ancient characters. That is a mistake in my opinion, and it is incumbent on any author of ancient history to put himself into ancient context and see ancient reality through ancient eyes and then interpret that reality and vision for the modern reader. Author Gabriel doesn't quite pull that off in this book. There are also many errors of translation from original sources, editing mistakes, inconsistencies and faulty interpretations. Ancient cavalry of course did not possess stirrups so could not break infantry formations through attacks with pikes or lances, but they could and did attack infantry with archery (remember the Parthians) and heavy cavalry using slashing swords (Alexander's Companion Cavalry.) The author indicates that the Roman cavalry rode up, dismounted, and fought on foot in spite of being lightly armoured and armed and also having to hold on to their horses. The Spanish cavalry used by the Carthaginians certainly didn't fight that way, nor have I read that the Romans did. In any case, infantry could defend itself effectively against non-archer cavalry with long pikes like those developed by Phillip and lengthened by Alexander. One must also remember that the horses in ancient times were smaller than medieval or modern horses due to the lack of fodder (oats had not been developed yet) during the winter. I recommend the prospective reader avail himself of all the reviews since most make very good points both good and bad, and then keep those points in mind while reading the book. Frankly, I liked the book and read past the problems I detected. Although the book was probably written for a general audience, it is also of value to the specialist. For contrast, the reader might also look at the work on Scipio by B. H. Liddell Hart. The writing is done well, and the author is to be commended for a valiant effort.

I have recently become interested in the history of the Punic wars & this Is essential reading for anyone interested in this period. I found the book to be well researched & extremely well written. Of course There is a lot that is not recorded/ lost from this age but Professor Gabriel Has taken the remaining sources & come to interesting, intelligent & logical Conclusions or assumptions where there is conjecture with the sources & justifies his reasonings very convincingly. Fantastic.

Gabriel sets out to compare and contrast the practices of Hannibal and Scipio. Hannibal is the master tactician. Hannibal`s tactics, are still used and studied in modern warfare. But where Hannibal was at fault, was in regards to his over all strategy. This lack of over all strategy, would end up being the downfall of Hannibal. Scipio was exceptional in both tactics and strategy. Scipio transforms the Roman army, and adopts the newer tactics used by Hannibal. But Scipio also develops a strategy, that enables the Romans to conquer the rival Carthaginians. Gabriel explains the process, that Scipio went through to transform the Roman army. He details how Scipio set out to destroy Hannibal`s army and the entire Carthaginian empire. Scipio combines both military tactics and an over strategy to win the Punic wars. Gabriel is a very well read military historian. Anyone with an appreciation of military history, will enjoy this book.

Buy this book. It is excellent, in my opinion.

A remarkable story about a very remarkable man whom history has chosen to forget. It would be a very different world if this man did not do what he did.

Well written and illustrated. Author uses key sources (Livy, Polybius, etc) to primarily assess the military campaigns of Scipio, before looking at his later life. Inevitably, there are speculations built on speculations, some of which I do not agree with, but that is part of the fun! I would suggest that it would be useful to know about the Second Punic War before reading this, as it would put Scipio's role in context. There should be little doubt that he is one of the greatest Generals, the army he fashioned remained one of the most effective and that he probably deserved better from Rome.